Recognises backups unprotected against tampering
Critical backups that an attacker reaching the primary could delete or encrypt.
Can AI do this?
Not settled yet The benchmark tested this, but the models' answers do not settle yet whether they master it. 0 of 4 models in the current benchmark master it.
| Model | Tier | Probability of mastery | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| gemini-4-argon | Flagship | 66% | Not shown |
| gemini-3.5-flash-lite | Low cost | 54% | Not shown |
| gpt-6-luna | Low cost | 54% | Not shown |
| claude-haiku-5-5 | Low cost | 66% | Not shown |
Mastered means a probability of at least 90% that the model has this knobit, estimated from its graded answers. “Not shown” means the answers do not settle it either way. How the models are tested.
What it looks like in practice
Expected result: The defect named on the mutable backups, and its fix or the question for its owner
How it is assessed: Flags the deficient case and passes the acceptable one. Deficient: DS-002 immutable: false Acceptable: Immutable or offline copies for every critical data set
Also known as: Backups not protected against tampering
Related knobits
Builds on
All 14 knobits of Plan backup, recovery and continuity.
Source: Review checklist 03-backup-recovery-continuity, row 9 (DORA Art. 12)